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1591 CASE NOTES 159 
Constitutional Law D A M A G E S  FOR LIBEL A NEW STANDARD FOR 
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS LIBELED IN A REPORT 
OF PUBLIC INTEREST- Gertz v .  Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997 
(1 974). 
In 1968 a Chicago youth was shot to death by a policeman. The 
youth's family subsequently brought a civil action against the policeman 
through their attorney, Elmer Gertz. In this capacity, Mr. Gertz came 
under attack in American Opinion, the monthly periodical of the John 
Birch Society,' through an article which contained numerous false state- 
ments of fact.2 Robert Welch, the magazine's editor, made no inquiry 
to determine the veracity of the charges against Gertz before he approved 
the article for publication. Instead, he attached an editorial introduc- 
tion declaring that the author had done extensive research into the 
case.3 
Gertz filed suit for libel against the magazine's publisher, Robert 
Welch, Inc., in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois. After ruling that the article's accusations were libel per se 
under Illinois law,4 the judge submitted the case to the jury for a deter- 
mination of damages. The jury returned a verdict for $50,000 in pre- 
sumed damages. However, the court granted defendant's motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that since Gertz had 
failed to prove actual malice, the defendant was protected by a constitu- 
tional privilege because the article dealt with a matter of public in te re~t .~  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed6 the lower court's ruling, 
citing the intervening Supreme Court decision of Rosen bloom v .  Metro- 
media, Inc.,7 wherein a plurality of the Court applied the "actual malice" 
standard to a private individual libeled in a report of general or public 
interest. 
'The society, through the American Opinion magazine and its other methods of com- 
munication, had been engaged in a campaign to inform the public of an alleged, nationwide, 
communist conspiracy aimed at discrediting local police as a prelude to the establishment of a 
national police force, which would then effectuate and sustain a communist dictatorship in the 
United States. As part of the continuing effort to alert the general citizenry to this danger, the 
managing editor of American Opinion, Robert Welch, commissioned the article on the 
murder trial of officer Nuccio which was subsequently published under the title "FRMME UP: 
Richard Nuccio and the War on Police." AMERICAN OPINION, April, 1969. 
2The article labeled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 'Communist-fronter" and implied that he had 
a criminal record. It further stated that he had been an official in the Mamist League for In- 
dustrial Democracy, described as a society which advocated the violent overthrow of the 
government. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3000-01 (1974). Gertz in fact had no 
criminal record, was not a communist, and never had been a member of the Marxist League 
for Industrial Democracy. Id. at 3000. 
394 S. Ct. at 3000-01. 
4Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
5Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
6Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972). 
7403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Rosenbloom 
standard as unduly abridging the state's interest in compensating private 
individuals for harm occasioned by a libel. The Court remanded the case 
for further proceedings in accord with its holding that private individuals 
in libel actions against the media may recover, on a showing of negligence, 
damages for actual injuries that are proven by competent evidence; how- 
ever, presumed and punitive damages are recoverable only if malice is 
shown.8 
Defamation has been defined as that which tends to injure the reputa- 
tion of an individual, to subject him to hatred or contempt, or to lower 
his esteem in the eyes of the community.9 Historically, defamation was 
not divided into the categories of libel and slander.10 The seignorial 
courtsl1 of the Middle Ages originally dealt with problems occasioned by 
defamatory utterance.l2 However, with the decline of the seignorial 
courts, the ecclesiastical courts13 took cognizance of defamation as a 
spiritual wrong.14 Following the invention of the printing press and the 
advent of printed defamation, the Court of Star Chamber15 took juris- 
- 
894 S. Ct. at 301 1. 
Sparmiter v. Coupland, 151 Eng. Rep. 340 (Ex. 1840). Dean Prosser suggests that Parmiter 
was the origin of the present definition of defamation. PROSSER, TORTS 5 11 1 n.17 (4th ed. 
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See, e.g., Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal. App. 2d 581, 126 
P.2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Ajouelo v. Auto-Soler Co., 61 Ga. App. 2d 216, 6 S.E.2d 415 
(1939); Cummins v. State, 89 Ind. App. 256, 166 N.E. 155 (1929). 
1°1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 5 5.9 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER &
JAMES]. See also Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 99, 105; Veeder, The 
History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 GLUM. L. REV. 546, 547 (1903) [hereinafter 
cited as Veeder] . 
llSeignorial courts were the courts the lord of a manor held over the villein tenants at- 
tached thereto. These courts were in existence at the time of the Norman Conquest in 1066. 
William the Conqueror, through the feudal system, greatly expanded the use of such courts 
for all civil matters pertaining to the manor. See W. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LAW 9 24 (2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as WALSH] . A brief but excellent overview of such 
courts is given in F. KEMPIN, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION T  ANGLO-AMERICAN L W 25 (2d ed. 
1973) [hereinafter cited as KEMPIN] . 
'*See generally PROSSER 5 111; Carr, The English Law of Defamation, 18 L.Q. REV. 255, 263 
(1902) [hereinafter cited as Carr] . 
13Ecclesiastical courts were the courts of the church, presided over by church officers. They 
were of Roman origin and, with the rise of Christianity, grew to occupy an important position 
throughout all of Western Europe. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH 
LAW 11 1-35 (2d ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND]. See also R. CAENEGEM, 
THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 12 n.28 (1973); Helmholz, Canonical Defamation in 
Medieval England, 15 AM. J .  LEGAL HIST. 255,256 (1971); Townsend, Slander and Libel, 6 AM. 
L. REV. 593,599 (1872) [hereinafter cited as Townsend]. 
14See generally POLLOCK 8c MAITLAND ch. 5; P. WALKER, THE COURTS OF LAW, ch. 7 (1970). 
15The Court of Star Chamber was created by an act introduced by Henry VII entitled Pro 
Camera Stellata in 1487, which gave the existing King's Council power to act as a court of 
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diction over printed defamatory material, deeming the printed wrong to 
be more serious than the spoken wrong.16 As the ecclesiastical courts' in- 
fluence declined, the common law courts first began to entertain writs for 
spoken defamation,'? eventually termed slander, and then for written 
defamation, which became known as libel. When the two actions were 
fully within the jurisdiction of the common law courts, they became 
further distinguished18 by the varying types of damages made available to 
plaintiffs for libel and slander. 
As historically evolved, the law of defamation encompasses three ele- 
ments of damage: general or presumed, special, and punitive. General 
or presumed damages compensate the libel victim for the presumed harm 
to his reputation.19 The jury considers loss of reputation, impairment of 
community standing, and psychological or mental suffering,ZO without 
requiring specific proof. Proof of reputational injury is unnecessary be- 
cause the damage is presumed to occur from publication of a libel. 
Special damages compensate for temporal loss, generally of a pecuniary 
nature.21 They are more important in the law of slander than in libel, 
since an action for slander cannot be maintained outside the per se cate- 
gories without pleading and proving special damagesz2 Once special 
criminal equity. Because the King's Council met in a room with ceiling studded with stars, 
the name Star Chamber was given to the court. The court eventually fell into disrepute due 
to its use of torture to procure evidence and the infliction of such punishments as pillory, 
mutilation, branding, and imprisonment. KEMPIN 40-41; WALKER 181. 
16De libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (K. B. 1609); WALSH 326; Carr 391; Veeder 555. 
''See generally WALSH § 168 n.64 and accompanying text; Townsend 601-03; Veeder 555-60. 
l8The 1670 case of King v.  Lake is cited as the first case distinguishing libel from slander. 
WALSH § 168 n.64. 
lgBecause reputation is an ephemeral concept, no precise formula exists by which to 
measure the amount of damage inflicted upon an individual's reputation. Hence, to sustain 
an action for libel, it has traditionally not been necessary to prove general damages. They were 
presumed as a matter of law to accrue from the fact of publication. Levert v. Daily States Pub- 
lishing Co., 123 La. 594,49 So. 206 (1909); Mayo v. Goldman, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 475, 122 S.W. 
449 (Ct. Civ. App. 1909); Wilson v. Sun Publishing Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 P. 774 (1915); 
HARPER & JAMES 5 5.30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 569, comment c at 56 (Tent. Draft 
No. 20, 1974); RESTATEMENT OF ORTS 8 62 1, comment a at 3 14 (1 938). 
20Hutchens v. Kuker 168 Neb. 451, 456, 96 N.W.2d 228, 231-32 (1959); Farrar v. Tribune 
Publishing Co., 57 Wash. 2d 549, 553, 358 P.2d 792, 795 (1961); Lamanna v. Scott Publishing 
Co., 48 Wash. 2d 683,692,296 P.2d 321,327 (1956). 
21Williams v. Rutherford Freight Lines, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 384, 179 S.E.2d 319 (Ct. App. 
197 1); J. GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER $5 202-06 (7th ed. 1974). 
22Fort V. Holt, 508 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 1973); McMullen v. Corkum, 143 Me. 47, 54 A.2d 
753 (1947); Olston v. Hallock, 55 Wis. 2d 687, 201 N.W.2d 35 (1972); J. CLERK & W. LINDSELL, 
TORTS $ 1681 at 1829 (13th ed. 1969); Veeder 571. Generally in pleading slander, a plaintiff 
will allege a specific loss for special damages. In cases where such a loss would be difficult to 
measure, the degree of specificity required in the supporting evidence may be somewhat de- 
creased. Cj Walter v. Bender, 22 N.J. Misc. 44, 35 A.2d 435 (S. Ct. 1943). But c j  HARPER &
JAMES 5 5.14. See generally MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 5 115 (1945) [hereinafter cited as 
MCCORMICK]. However, if the defamatory words are termed slander per se, (e.g., imputing a 
criminal offense, a venereal or other loathsome communicable disease, unchastity of a woman, 
or misconduct of an individual's business or means of obtaining a living) there need be no 
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damages are proven in such an action, general damages to reputation may 
be presumed and compensated for by the j ~ r y . ~ 3  
Punitive damages are awarded to a plaintiff in either a libel or a 
slander action where the defendant has acted with mali~e.~4 Malice, in 
this sense, connotes a feeling of ill wilLZ5 The jury has considerable dis- 
cretion in affixing the monetary amount of punitive damages, subject 
only to the constraint that damages must not be excessive.26 
The law of libel in the United States has recently undergone modifica- 
tion by the Supreme Court, beginning with the 1964 landmark case of 
New York Times Co. u. S u l l i ~ a n . ~ ~  That case presented the issue of 
whether a public official, libeled in his official capacity, could recover 
damages under state law that permitted injury to his reputation to be 
presumed merely from the publication of a defamatory falsehood. It was 
held that to adequately protect the constitutional guarantee of freedom 
of the press as contained in the first and fourteenth amendments, a pub- 
lic official must prove malice on the part of the press before a recovery for 
injury can be all0wed.~8 The Court defined malice as a knowledge of the 
falsity of a statement or a reckless disregard as to its truthfulness.29 If 
malice were shown, the plaintiff could recover presumed and punitive 
damages.30 Curtis Publishing Co. v.  Butts3l extended the rule of New 
proof of special damages for the action to lie and general damages to reputation will be pre- 
sumed. Hutchins v. Kuker, 168 Neb. 451, 96 N.W.2d 228 (1959); Mayo v. Goldman, 57 Tex. 
Civ. App. 475, 122 S.W. 449 (Ct. Civ. App. 1909); Wilson v. Sun Publishing Co., 85 Wash. 503, 
148 P. 774 (1915); PROSSER 5 112. 
~~PROSSER 5 112; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS $ 575 comment a at 185 (1938); J. SALMOND, TORTS 
5 120 11.17 (13th ed. 1961). 
24Kahermanes v. Marchese, 361 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Ag-Chem. Equipment Co. 
v. Hahn, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1972); Big Wheel Restaurants, Inc. v. Bronstein, 
302 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973); MCCORMICK 5 118. 
25Malice may also connote more than ill will. I t  may imply evil motive, intent to injure, 
spite, envy, hatred, desire to degrade, knowledge of falsity, wanton disregard for another's 
rights, etc. See Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784 (Alas. 1964); Bloomfield v. 
Retail Credit Co., 14 Ill. App. 3d 158, 302 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 54 Wis. 2d 
578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1972). C j  Malice as used in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254,270 (1964). 
26See Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 115 N.W.2d 259 (1962) cert. denied, 371 U.S. 
862 (1962); Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258 (1958); MCCORMICK 
5 120 n.105; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 5 908 comment a at 556 (1938). A caveat should be 
added. Present day libel law varies from state to state. T o  ascertain deviations from the his- 
torical development discussed herein, one should check local statutes and case law. 
27376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
2*Id. at 283. 
29Id. at 280. 
3OAs a result of Gertz, punitive damages may be disallowed in future libel actions except 
under the most egregious of circumstances. Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 
2197 (D. Cal. Oct. 18, 1974). 
S1388 US. 130 (1967). 
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York Times from public officials to public f ig~res .3~ In Rosenbloom v .  
Metromedia, Inc.,33 the predecessor of Gertz, a plurality of the Court 
further advanced the constitutional privilege enjoyed by the press by 
establishing the "public issue" categ0ry.3~ Under this extension, anyone 
libeled by the press in its discussion of a topic of public concern or general 
interest must meet the malice test set forth in New York T ime~ .3~  
In Gertz v .  Robert Welch, I n ~ . , 3 ~  the Court again faced the problem of 
balancing the competing interests of freedom of the press with the state's 
interest in compensating private individuals for injury flowing from 
libel. 
The Court concluded that freedom of the press was being chilled un- 
der the majority of state libel laws, notwithstanding the protection af- 
forded by New York Times and Curtis. The chilling effect resulted from 
four common characteristics of libel suits brought by private individuals. 
First, under the doctrine of strict liability, any publication of a libel, 
whether committed mistakenly or intentionally, subjected the publisher 
to liability. Second, the doctrine of presumed damages permitted the 
jury to award damages for injury to reputation without any showing of 
proof. Third, the jury's broad discretion in assessing damages often re- 
sulted in inflated awards which bore no relationship to the degree of in- 
321d. at 155. Three separate opinions were written in Curtis. Although Mr. Justice Harlan 
announced the opinion for the Court, his characterization of the test as proof of " [hlighly 
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation 
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers . . ." was supported only by a 
plurality of the Court. Id. Justices Brennan and White concurred with Chief Justice Warren 
in extending the New York Times test and not an adulterated standard to media criticism of 
public officials and figures. Id. at 172. Justices Black and Douglas, in a separate opinion, 
concurred with the Chief Justice, but did so only to create a majority for the extension of the 
test. Id. at 170. Their view was that publishers have absolute immunity from defamation 
suits. 
33403 U S  29 (1971). 
341d. at 43. 
35It should be noted, however, that there was no dear majority opinion in Rosenbloom. 
Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger opted for a test based not on the status 
of the individual involved but upon whether an issue of public concern or general interest was 
involved. Id. at 30. Justice Black, who concurred with the result, viewed the first amendment 
as giving absolute protection to the press from actions against them for defamation. Id. at 57. 
Justice White concurred, but stated he would hold that the New York Times test should apply 
only to those private individuals libeled in a report concerning the official acts of public 
officers. Id. at 57. Justice Harlan dissented, voicing opposition to requiring private individuals 
to meet the same standards as public officials and public figures, arguing that a change from 
strict liability for libel to a different basis of liability would be the most appropriate direction 
for the law to move. Id. at 62. Justice Marshall dissented, voicing concern over the possible 
consequences of making the courts determine what information is and is not necessary for 
self-government. Id. at 78. Justice Stewart, in his dissent, voiced the same fearful possiblity as 
did Justice Marshall. Id. at 80. Justice Douglas took no part in the decision. 
3694 S. Ct. 2997 (1974). 
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jury suffered. Fourth, juries could assess punitive damages, where a 
plaintiff proved malice, in amounts that bore no relationship to the in- 
jury incurred and which tended to punish the defendant who espoused 
an unpopular point of view. These four considerations prompted the 
Court in Rosenbloom to extend the actual malice test to private individ- 
uals libeled in reports of public interest. 
~ e e v a l u a t i n ~  its former stance, the Court agreed with Gertz that the 
public issue category as established in Rosen bloom unduly abridged the 
state's interest in compensating injury to reputation in two respects. 
First, private individuals have leu access than public officials or public 
figures to the media and are therefore generally unable to vindicate their 
reputation by a public response. Second, private individuals are more 
deserving of recovery because, unlike public officials and public figures, 
they have not voluntarily entered the public forum and assumed the risks 
attendant thereto. Therefore, the Gertz Court attempted to remedy the 
chilling effect that large awards for libel have on the freedom of the press 
without unduly limiting the right of an individual to b-e recompensed for 
injury suffered as the victim of a libel by establishing the following stan- 
dards: first, states may determine for themselves the basis of liability to 
be applied, so long as it is not strict liability; second, presumed and puni- 
tive damages are abolished unless the plaintiff can show malice on the 
part of the media defendant per New York Times; third, if malice is not 
shown, the plaintiff is to be compensated only for the actual injury he 
suffers, i-e., that injury which is proved by competent evidence. Those 
injuries which may be proved are not limited to purely economic loss, 
but also include reputational damage, pain, suffering, and emotional 
distress. 
111. ANALYSIS 
A. The  Evidentiary Problem 
In Gertz, the Court uprooted the doctrine of presumed damages and 
discarded it in favor of a standard that requires all damages, except in 
cases where malice is shown, to be supported by competent proof. How- 
ever, because the Court failed to articulate the quality of proof that is 
competent to establish harm to reputation, Gertz strikes at best a tenuous 
balance between the competing interests of free press and protection of 
personal reputation. Establishing this balance was in fact left to trial 
judges who must decide what is competent evidence as a matter of law. 
Traditionally, presumed damages have been equated with general 
damages for reputational injury. There was no requirement that this 
type of harm be actually proven. However, because Gertz now requires 
that reputational injury be shown by competent evidence, a primary 
question for determination is what type of proof is competent to establish 
harm to reputation. If general evidence will satisfy the competent proof 
standard, the chilling effect on freedom of the press in the form of media 
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selfcensorship will not be eliminated. For example, would it be suf- 
ficient to have one witness testify in broad and general terms that, based 
upon the prevailing community opinion, the victim's reputation has been 
harmed? Such a minimal evidentiary requirement does not differ sig- 
nificantly from the traditional rule presuming damage to a libel victim's 
reputation. It is, therefore, doubtful whether one witness would be suf- 
ficient to affirmatively establish injury. Juries would still be free to 
award substantial sums for reputational harm, once its existence was es- 
tablished by general evidence. If one witness is inadequate to establish 
injury to reputation by general testimony, are two, three, or even four 
sufficient? Conceivably, the defense could counter with its own wit- 
nesses, stating in general terms that no injury had been done. The trial 
could then quickly degenerate into a mere race to accumulate more wit- 
nesses than the opposing party, a method reminiscent of trial by oath- 
helpers.37 In any event, because proving or disproving reputational harm 
through general testimony of a witness departs insignificantly from the 
traditional rule of presuming damages to one's reputation, a rule requir- 
ing that reputational injury be supported by general evidence will not 
alleviate the chilling effect of large libel awards upon the freedom of the 
press. 
On the other hand, if the Court intended to require specific evidence 
to prove reputational injury,38 the right of the libel victim to recover is 
severely abridged.39 In the past, specific evidence has been necessary to 
show special damages, e.g., whether a plaintiff has suffered an out-of- 
pocket loss. Specific evidence is inappropriate, however, to prove injury 
to reputation because reputation is an ephemeral concept, not subject to 
specific physical definition.40 For this reason it was traditionally believed 
3'0ath-helpers were individuals that took an oath, swearing to the veracity of a defendant's 
oath that he was not guilty of the offense charged. This ancient form of trial eventually 
evolved into the present-day jury system. WALSH 79; see E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 46 (2d ed. 1922); KEMPIN 54. 
38Requiring specific proof is suggested by the Court's lumping into the category of "actual 
injury" those injuries that were previously compensated by both general and special damages. 
The implication is that if one type of evidence is to be required to prove all injuries, harm to 
reputation must now be shown by the same quality of proof traditionally employed to es- 
tablish special damages. 
3% his dissent, Justice White asserts that the rule announced in Gertz regarding general 
damages will eliminate recovery for presumed damages in analogous cases of slander, not ac- 
tionable per se. Apparently, Justice White would interpret the majority opinion to mean that 
general evidence will be inadequate to show damage to reputation. 
40An exception to the hearsay rule has traditionally permitted general evidence of reputa- 
tion to be admitted. The rationale behind the exception lay in the difficulty of proving the 
matter in question by other forms of evidence. The testimony offered was not the individual 
assertion of the witness, nor did it deal with specific acts. The requirement was firmly estab- 
lished that the testimony must relate only to matters of common community knowledge. 
V WIGMORE, VIDENCE 55 1580,1584-86 (3d ed. 1940). 
In defamation cases, the reputation evidence represented a composite of the esteem in 
which the community held the defamed party. Again, witness testimony was confined to the 
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that harm to one's reputation could not be specifically proved and there- 
fore was appropriately presumed.41 Where damage to one's reputation is 
required to be proved by specific evidence, there may well be an elimina- 
tion of most, if not all, future awards for injury to r e p ~ t a t i o n . ~ ~  There is 
no doubt that through the imposition of a standard of proof so stringent 
that injury to reputation becomes nearly impossible to prove, the num- 
ber of large awards for damage to reputation will be drastically curtailed. 
This approach might indeed solve the problem of excessive awards which 
faced the Gertr Court, but only at the expense of the second objective, 
preserving to the state the right to compensate its private citizens for harm 
occasioned by libel. Thus, a determination that specific evidence is to 
be required in future libel suits is to interpret Gertz as a judicial declara- 
tion that harm to reputation in most libel cases is nonexistent, a premise 
antithetical to defamation law. However, even with this rigid applica- 
tion of the competent evidence standard limiting the number of cases 
where damages might be awarded, the dollar amount for libel damages 
that a jury may affix in any one case is still unimpaired. Once the court 
determines that the evidence of actual injury is competent, the jury may 
still ascertain, according to its discretion, the amount of damages to be 
awarded. Hence, the specific evidence approach does little to provide an 
equitable balance of freedom of the press with the state right to compen- 
sate its citizens for reputational injuries occasioned by libel. 
Presumably, courts will now begin to fashion compromise approaches 
to the problems presented in establishing injury to reputation through 
either general or specific evidence. One solution might be to require a 
combination of specific and general proof. For example, a plaintiff 
would be allowed to prove harm to his reputation through general testi- 
mony, but only after he had established some special damage or economic 
detriment by specific proof. Failing this, no award for reputational 
harm based upon general proof would be allowed. This approach is 
analogous to the present-day practice in slander actions. Unless there is 
slander per se, an award for presumed damages is permitted only if the 
plaintiff first establishes special injury by specific proof. Such a com- 
expressions of the general community attitude toward the plaintiff and not to specific instances 
or occurrences. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE $ 249 at 595 (2d ed. 1972). 
A relaxation of this past standard can be seen in the recently enacted Federal Rules of Evi- 
dence wherein reputation may be established by opinion evidence, i.e., the witness speaking 
for himself and not for the community. However, he may not relate specific instances upon 
which he bases his opinion except on cross-examination or when a character trait, such as 
honesty, is placed in issue. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595 $8 405(a), (b) Jan. 2, 
1975. 
dlCases and authorities cited note 19 supra. 
42Justice White, in his dissent, foresaw this consequence when, speaking of competent proof 
of actual injury, he stated " [i] t will be exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible, for him [the 
plaintiff] to vindicate his reputation interest by securing a judgment for nominal damages. . . ." 
94 S. Ct. at 3025. 
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promise, however, may be overly restrictive. The class of plaintiffs able 
to show special damages is, as a practical matter, narrowed to those having 
business enterprises. Because special injury connotes an economic or 
material detriment, specific quantification and proof of such injury is 
most readily available where a specific business enterprise has suffered 
due to a libel. Therefore, the self-employed businessman can more easily 
posit an economic detriment than those who are not self-employed. Even 
if a plaintiff is a businessman, however, he would still have to show a 
causal connection between the libel and the injury. If it is difficult for a 
businessman to prove that a decrease in his profits was caused by a libe1,43 
it would seem equally if not more difficult for a nonbusinessman, such as 
a construction foreman, to establish a decrease in earnings as the proxi- 
mate result of a defamatory publication as a predicate to recovery for 
rep~tation.~4 Clearly, courts face a difficult task in fashioning a com- 
promise approach to proof of reputational injury. 
Due to the broad discretion now permitted by the Supreme Court's 
failure to define competent evidence required for proof of reputational 
injury, the evidentiary standard applied in future libel cases will reflect 
the lower courts' conclusions regarding the weight to be given freedom of 
the press as opposed to the state's right to compensate libel victims. 
Some courts may favor recovery and will adopt the general evidence ap- 
proach to proving reputational harm. Others may favor the press and 
will choose the more restrictive specific evidence or a combination ap- 
proach.45 In any event, the degree of uncertainty in this new standard 
43An interesting analogy to the problem of proving causation in a libel suit can be found in 
the Uniform Commercial Code section 4-402 which provides that " [a] payor bank is liable to 
its customer for damages proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item. When the 
dishonor occurs through mistake, liability is limited to actual damages proved." UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402. In American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 146 Ind. 
App. 112, 252 N.E.2d 839 (1969), the court held that even though Flick had proved a decline 
in and the subsequent demise of his used car business, he had failed to show that the bank's 
wrongful dishonor of certain of his checks and a wrongful setoff against his account by the 
bank, which resulted in doubt being cast upon his business solvency, proximately caused his 
injury. Although Flick did not sue for libel of his credit reputation, the difficulty of proving 
causation is analogous because of similar consequences flowing from the effect of the wrongful 
dishonor of checks. If it is difficult to prove that a decline in one's business was caused by an  
impaired credit reputation, then it will be even more dificult to prove that libel of one's 
general reputation is the proximate cause of some special injury. 
44However, if subsequent to the libel there exists no visible economic detriment, such as 
loss of one's job, upon which to fasten a causal connection, the defamed individual may be 
effectively excluded from any recovery for damages to reputation, although the defamation be 
of such an egregious nature that " [s] ubstantial danger to reputation is apparent." 94 S. Ct. at 
301 1. 
451n Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 
2300 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1974) the court went one step further and chose to retain the New 
York Times test as applied in Rosenbloom, reasoning that under Gertz, the state could define 
for itself a stricter standard than the one enunciated therein. The court felt that the distinc- 
tion between the large majority of public officials and private citizens with respect to their 
ability to respond to a libel was meaningless, especially when the libel occurs in a discussion of 
public interest. 
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serves neither the press nor the individual.46 
Courts in general have had and continue to have, apart from the corn, 
petent evidence standard now espoused in Gertz, a discretionary method 
of control over the amount of damages awarded by juries. If a court 
determines that a jury award is unjustified or excessive, it can in its dis  
cretion order a remittitur47 or, in the alternative, a new trial on the dam- 
age issue.48 By concluding that large damage awards threaten freedom of 
the press, it would seem that the Court apparently believes application of 
this discretionary principle has failed." If courts have not properly em- 
ployed their discretion to use the remittitur device, it is questionable 
whether the availability of the discretionary standard of competent evi- 
dence will cure the problem of large damage awards in libel cases. 
The Court's holding poses another definitional problem for the lower 
courts. The Gertz standard applies when " [t] he substance of the de- 
famatory statement 'makes substantial danger to reputation apparent. ' "50 
Thus, courts, of necessity, are forced to decide which words or combina- 
tion of words, set against present-day standards and social values, are of 
such potent defamatory meaning that substantial danger to reputation 
becomes apparent. At first blush, it appears that this duty is but a re- 
statement of the past function of courts in defamation actions. Courts 
have always been faced with a threshold determination of whether the 
alleged defamation might have a tendency to injure the party at whom it 
- - - 
461n his dissent, Justice Brennan states "the probable result of today's decision will . . . lead 
to self-censorship since publishers will be required carefully to weigh a myriad of uncertain 
factors before publication." 94 S. Ct. at 3020. Although Justice Brennan's remarks were 
generally directed to the standard of care Gertz requires of publishers, it implies that as the 
factors affecting the possible outcome of a suit against the media increase, so will self-censor- 
ship. Hence, failing to define adequately the competent evidence standard may lead to in- 
creased media self-censorship. 
4'A remittitur is a procedural device whereby the court suggests that the plaintiff accept a 
reduction in the damage award. If the plaintiff agrees, a reduction is ordered. If not, the 
judge may order a new trial on the issue of damages. The judge may do this because in theory 
he has the discretion to grant a new trial. Hence, the remittitur is simply an exercise of his 
discretion. The plaintiff may not complain because he acquiesces in the reduction while the 
defendant may not complain because the jury has already fixed his liability, which could be 
sustained if the judge did not exercise his discretion. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 8 7.21 at 
322 (1965). 
48See generally Comment, Correction of Damage Verdicts by Remittitur and Additur, 44 
YALE L.J. 318 (1934). 
49For a general collection of cases dealing with remittitur, see Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1163, 1166- 
68 (1935); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 779,783-92 (1928). 
5094 S. Ct. at 301 1. The Court said this phrase places the Gertz guidelines in perspective, 
One possible interpretation of this language, consistent with the Court's objectives of balancing 
freedom of the press with the right to be recompensed for libel, would be that courts now have 
the responsibility to determine if a publication is defamatory and injurious on its face. The 
Court intimates that when a statement does not warn a publisher of its defamatory potential, 
an individual's right to compensation may be restricted by a much higher standard than that 
announced in Gertz. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
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was directed.S1 Once the court decided that such a tendency could exist, 
the question of whether in fact it did exist and was understood as being 
defamatory was submitted to the jury.52 If this factual question was 
answered in the affirmative and no valid defense was raised, the jury 
assessed damages. However, the new standard seems to raise the thresh- 
old determination of a "tendency to injure" to a level which abro- 
gates, by implication, the jury function of determining whether the alle- 
gations were understood as defamatory and damage was incurred. This 
is so because when courts decide that substantial danger to reputation is 
present, they have implicitly determined that the defamatory material 
did have a tendency to injure, that it was in fact so understood, and was, 
for all practical purposes, injurious. 
However, because defamation affects an individual within the context 
of his community reputation, it must be viewed against a backdrop 
formed by the social mores, norms, and general societal attitudes of the 
community.53 Courts have had difficulty using this backdrop in defining 
Indeed, the problem has plagued them for over a decade.55 
Not having been able to define what is obscene, using as a guide com- 
munity norms and attitudes, it may be questioned whether by using the 
same guide courts will be able to define what is a defamatory statement 
making "substantial danger to reputation apparent. " 
B. A Proposed Alternative 
A viable solution to the problem of excessive damage awards would be 
to declare that damages for reputational injury may be presumed, but 
5lInitially, the judge could rule as a matter of law that the allegations were either de- 
famatory or  could reasonably be so construed. MacRae v. Afro-American Co., 172 F. Supp. 
184, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1959), affd, 274 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1960); HARPER & JAMES § 5.1 at 350. See 
also Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 192 (D.D.C. 1965). 
Wurt is  Publishing Co. v. Vaughan, 278 F.2d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 
(1960); Weider v. Hoffman, 238 F. Supp. 437, 441 (M.D. Pa. 1965); MacRae v. Afro-American 
Co., 172 F. Supp. 184, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1959), a f f d ,  274 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1960). 
53Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1947); HARPER & JAMES § 5.4; 22 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 513, 515 (1947); Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371,420 
(1969). 
540bscenity is similar to defamation in that its definition depends upon social customs, 
mores, and attitudes; it involves constitutional protection of the press; and it has an alleged 
injurious effect upon society. However, unlike obscenity, injuries caused by defamation may 
be quantified. Nevertheless, the analogy does merit consideration. Cf: Merin, Libel and the 
Supreme Court, 1 1 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371,420 (1969). 
55See Hamling v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of 
a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476 (1957). 
In  Miller, the Court determined that obscenity is a question for the trier of fact, to be deter- 
mined by applying "contemporary community standards." 413 U.S. at 24. In Hamling, the 
Court added that "juror [s] [are] entitled to draw on [their] own knowledge of the views of 
the average person in the community . . . ." 94 S. Ct. at 2901. 
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only in nominal am0unts.~6 In receiving an award of nominal damages, 
a plaintiff is able to vindicate his reputation ~ymbolically~~ by proving 
the falsity of the defamatory charge. T o  merit more than a nominal dam- 
age award for injury to reputation, a plaintiff would be required to sub- 
stantiate his claim by either (1) proving some special injury, coupled with 
general evidence of reputational harm, or (2) by proving beyond a reason- 
able doubt that serious injury accrued to his reputation, using either 
general or specific evidence. 
Admittedly, such a system will restrict recovery of reputational dam- 
ages, in many cases, to those individuals best suited to prove special in- 
jury, e.g., businessmen. However, the restriction will not operate to 
deprive all injured parties from any recovery for harm to reputation. 
Individuals who suffer severe injury to reputation are given a chance to 
prove their case and be recompensed, provided they meet the burden of 
showing such injury by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts are 
generally familiar with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and can 
appropriately instruct juries regarding its application. In this manner, 
recovery for injury to reputation would be limited to those individuals 
recognized by the jury as being most deserving. 
Courts and juries would continue to perform the same functions they 
presently do in libel cases. The court would make the initial determina- 
tion of whether the publication might have a tendency to injure the vic- 
tim's reputation. The jury would then decide if in fact it was injured. If 
the reputation of the victim was found by the jury to have suffered, 
nominal damages would be presumed and awarded. Further evidence of 
special damages, or severe reputational injury, would be submitted to the 
jury for its determination. In this manner, the problem of judicially de- 
fining what words make substantial danger to reputation apparent is 
avoided. The jury and not the court is the barometer measuring de- 
famation and the consequent injury against the rise and fall of societal 
norms, standards, and mores. 
Finally, courts would retain their discretionary powers of new trial and 
remittitur where damages are deemed excessive, as well as their tradi- 
tional powers of directed verdict and judgment n.0.v. where damages are 
not sufficiently shown. In short, the media would not be as subject to the 
56Although "nominal damages" will not be rigidly defined, a suggested approach would 
allow an award of attorney fees and court costs as well as some daily compensation for time a 
plaintiff spends away from his job in court. 
Historically, a plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages even if the jury believed that no 
harm had been done to his reputation. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 5 620 (1938); MCCORMICK 5 22; 
HARPER 8C JAMES 5 5.30 at 468. 
57A minimal damage award, however, may reflect adversely upon the character of the vic- 
torious plaintiff. The inference is that the jury considered his reputation to be of such little 
value that even though an egregious libel occurred, scant harm was done to the victim's al- 
ready poor reputation. Such was the case in Q.B. V I I  where Dr. Kelno was awarded damages 
of one half-penny, the lowest coin of the realm. L. URIS, Q.B. VII (1970). 
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chilling effect of unjustified damage awards, yet the injured plaintiff 
would be afforded the opportunity to vindicate his good name and to be 
compensated for his injured business and reputational interests. The re- 
- sult of this approach would be a more equitable balance between the 
competing interests of freedom of the press and the right of an individual 
to recover for harm to his reputation.58 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court in Gertz set about to clarify the constitutional ramifications 
of libel that have arisen from New York Times and its progeny. This ob- 
jective may not have been achieved as Gertz now presents additional 
problems of determining what type of evidence is competent to establish 
actual injury and how courts will apply the discretion accorded them in 
limiting unjustified jury awards. Rather than being a definitive ruling 
on the state of the law, as Justice Blackmun asserts, Gertz may create con- 
fusion and uncertainty in the law of defamation if courts do not ade- 
quately deal with the new challenges posed by this ruling. 
Constitutional Law -EQUAL PROTECTION -DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
PREGNANCY IS NOT SEX DISCRIMINATION - Geduldig v. Aiello, 41 7 US.  
484 (1 974). 
In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court held in Geduldigv. 
Aiellol that four California women who were refused state insurance 
benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities were not denied equal protec- 
tion of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.2 Moreover, in the 
opinion of the majority, disparate treatment of pregnant persons vis 2i vis 
nonpregnant persons was not sex discrimination.3 
Carolyn Aiello and three other women, each suffering from a 
pregnancy-related disability,* were denied state disability insurance 
58If the premise that freedom of the press needs more protection than it presently receives is 
rejected, the approach suggested becomes oppressive to the libel victim. As with all balancing 
problems, however, a line must be drawn. The approach detailed represents one believed to 
be equitable to both interests. 
'Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
2"No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, $1. 
3417 U.S. at 496-97 & n.20. 
4The four disability claims consisted of an ectopic pregnancy, a tuba1 pregnancy, 
carriage, and a claim of physical incapacitation. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 
(N.D. Cal. 1973). 
of the 
a mis- 
794-95 
